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Introduction

The ethical drug industry is a major component of the
pharmaceutical industry.

Ethical drug manufacturers produce drugs

for which a physician's prescription is required, as opposed to
over-the-counter drugs.

This industry is characterized by

competition based on innovation, with the development and
marketing of new or improved drug products.

Products are synthesized

in the laboratories of the companies and tested prior to marketing.

Relatively few products which are discovered and synthesized in
the laboratory become marketable products.
are varied.

The reasons for this

Often a company will patent a new chemical entity

and prevent other companies from developing this same product.

A drug may be shown to have little effect or may cause deleterious
side effects.

A major barrier to the development and marketing of

new drug products is regulation by the government.

The ethical

drug industry has been regulated since 1938 by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) under the provisions of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act.

The function and primary mandate of this agency

is to ensure the safety of medicines and all other products which
are directly consumed by the public.

To this end, the FDA requires

extensive laboratory and clinical testing of all new drugs prior
to their approval for general marketing.

Following the thalidomide

tragedies-of the early 1960's and claims of ineffective or unsafe

1

2

drugs being released on the open market, drug testing requirements

were intensified.

The provisions of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris

amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act required not only

safety testing but also proof of effectiveness and a summary of
possible side effects.
regulation8

The testing process was made subject to FDA

The companies were required to submit plans for clinical

testing of each new product along with data from preclinical
laboratory tests.
In addition to the preclinical and clinical testing of new
products prior to approval by the FDA, drug safety amendments,
proposed in 1977, would add yet another phase to the testing
process.

They would require the limiting of sales, after

preliminary approval to a small control group before general
marketing could begin.

This group would be monitored for signs of

adverse reactions.
It was suggested that increased government regulatory requirements

have seriously injured the drug industry.

Schwartzman charged

that the FDA, by ignoring the economic impact of regulation, bas
hindered innovation by drug manufacturers (1).

He calculated

that the rate of return on Research and Development (Rand D)
investments declined from 12% in 1960 to a current rate of
approximately 3.3%, after taxes.

Sarett showed that the average

development time for a new product rose from 2 years in 1960 to 6-8
years in 1968-72.
1

Bailey stated that between the years of 1954-1961,

Schwartzman, D.; Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry;

1976; Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore & London.

3
22L~ new drugs were introduced whereas only 87 were introduced

beL',een 1962-1969, after the passage of the amendments (2).
The expenditures required to produce a new product also

increased in the post-Kefauver period (Table I).

In 1960 the cost

TABLE I
Annual Expenditure Required to Develop
a Constant Number of New Drugs
(Millions of 1957-59 Dollars)
Before 1962

N

After 1962

$12.95
29.94
54.45
88.03
133 .40
194.10

5

10
15
20
25
30
Source:

$29.09
70.55
128.33
207.40
314.40
457.40

Baily, M., J. Polit. Econ., 1972, v. 80, p. 78.

of development of a new drug was $1.3 million.

This was compared

with a cost of approximately $11.5 million in 1972 (3).

While

total Rand D expenditures increased by 50% in the last five years,
partially due to inflation, the development cost of a single drug
rose over 200%.

The result was that the industry cut back on

research projects.

The FDA argued that the sharp decline in

innovation, as measured by the number of new drugs approved, was

not a consequence of regulation but was a result of a depletion of
new opportunities in biomedical knowledge.

In the American Economic

Review, Grabowski reported that Rand D productivity declined six-fold
2
3

Baily, M. J.; Polit. Econ.; 1972; v. 80, pp. 70-85.
.

Sarett, L. H.; Research Mgmt.; 1974; v. 27, pp. 18-20.

4

in the U.S. between 1960 and 1971 while it declined only half as
much in Great Britain during the same period (4).

The difference

was attributed to more strict regulatory procedures associated with

the Kefauver amendments.

Many drugs which were used successfully

overseas for many years were prohibited in the U.S. as a result of
FDA efforts.
Spending for Rand Don new drugs gradually shifted overseas
during the past five years.

Domestic expenditures over this period

increased 2 .3% per year while expe.nditures by

u. S.

companies abroad

increased at a rate of 19%, adjusted for inflation.
There has also been a shift in the output of research efforts
as far as the number of companies involved in Rand D.
has become more concentrated in a few large companies as

of the higher costs and tighter budgeting.

This output

a

result

Grabowski showed

that between 1957 and 1961 the four largest companies share
of research output was 24%.

48.7% (Table II).

Between 1967 and 1971 this share was

Since Schwartzman showed that the pharmaceutical

industry accounted for 91% of all new drug research between 1960
and 1969, it was seen that the output of the four largest companies
was a major source of innovation.

There seemed to be a consensus

that these shifts in Rand D spending were adaptive measures by the
industry to the adverse regulatory climate in the U.S.

In the long

run the lower rates of return coupled with sharply increased costs
for research and development and the·increased time lag for
realization of profits from Rand D investment, caused in part by
4
Grabowski, H. G. and Vernon, J. M.; American Econ. Review;

1977; v. 67, No. l; pp. 354-371.
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TABLE II
Decline in Number of New Chemical Entity (NCE)
Introductions in Post- Amendment Period and
Concentration of Innovative Output by

U.S. Ethical Drug Industry
Periods
1957-61

1962 -66

1967-71

233

93

76

51

34

23

$738.6

$726.8

1.

Total ff NCE's

2.

ff Firms having NCE's

3.

Sales of NCE' s in
first three years $1220.3
after introduction

4.

Four largest
Firm's share of
innovational output

5.

Four largest Firm's
share of sales

Source:

24%

2570

48.7%

26.5%

2470

26.1%

Grabowski, G. A. and Vernon, J.M., American Econ. 1977,
v. 67, no. 1, p. 365.

FDA regulation, indicated a declining research commitment by the
companies.

Many projects which would normally have been undertaken

in the past are _no longer economically feasible.

Steiner considered the government to be a key external
environmental force affecting and influencing the business firm.

He stated that in its dealings with business, goVernment was quite
capable of lodging unexpected burdens on particular industries and
companies (5).
The main problem defined in this study is that there are several
5

Steiner, G. A. ~nd Miner, J.B.; Management Policy and Review;

1977; MacMillan; New York and London.
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areas of the firms' operations which could be affected by regulatory
policies and which would therefore be of concern to management~

These range from the expected profitability of new drug research
projects to the general attitude of the investment community and

the public toward the securities of companies which were so heavily

regulated.

Of primary concern would be the expected profitability

of Rand D projects under various regulatory climates.

The

profitability of a research project could be affected by an increased
time required to test market a drug to a small control group before
general marketing could begin.

This would increase the time over

which development costs would be incurred and delay the realization
of revenues and profits from the investment in Rand D for the new
product.

If ·the increased time and monetary costs were excessive,

then the profitability, as measured by capital budgeting techniques
such as the profitability index or net present value analysis,
would be lowered, possibly to the point where the project could not
be justified on the basis of the expected monetary benefits to be
derived.

If a large number of such projects were rejected as too

unprofitable, the amount of innovation in the firm would decrease.
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine the effect of
government-related changes in the profitability of Rand D projects
on the decisions by management to invest in further Rand D spending.
Information on rates of return for Rand D investment and the length
of time for cash inflows from sales of the products were used to
calculate the expected profitability of Rand D projects.

The various

capital budgeting techniques, which used the time value of money,

7
were evaluated for their use in decision making for Rand D projects
under marketing restrictions imposed by the government.

Present

value calculations, using the cost and income figures of other
authors in the field, were used to determine if the projects
which led to the development of new drug products would have been
profitable using the acceptance criteria for present value analysis~

Literature Survey

Net Present Value analysis techniques have been used by
other authors to determine the expected rate of return and the
profitability of Rand D investment.
reviewed in this chapter.

Their contributions were

Additional information related to risk,

development times and development costs was also presented.

Of the thousands of chemical compounds that are synthesized
in pharmaceutical laboratories only a small percentage ever become

marketable drug products.
successful and profitable.

An even smaller percentage are highly
In 1970, according to the Pharmaceutical

Manufacturers Association, 126,060 compounds were extracted or

synthesized and over 700,000 were tested pharmacologically.

Of

these, 1,013 reached the final testing stage and only 16 were
successful in passing all tests and obtaining FDA approval for
marketing.

Wardell and Lasagna surveyed fifteen major drug companies

and reported on the number of Investigational New Drug Applications
which eventually became approved New Drug Applications.

Their

results showed that, by April 1974, only 7.1 percent of all
Investigational New Drug Applications filed from 1963 through 1967
had resulted in approved New Drug Applications (1).

The data

1
Wardell, W. and Lasagna, L.; Conference on Drug Development
and Marketing; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research; 1974; Washington, D.C.

s
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indicated only a .07 probability of a clinically tested new chemical
entity being marketed.

Therefore, a company that is considering a

large .investment in Rand D faces a high level of uncertainty as
to whether the investment will be profitable,

This uncertainty

must be considered in any capital budgeting decisions made by

management.

As a measure of risk, Clymer used the attrition rate of compounds
entering the development process (2),

He says that the attrition

rate has increased as a result of increased requirements and

interpretive regulations brought about by the 1962 Drug Amendments,
From 1965 to 1968 the ratio of FDA rejections to investigational
new drug applications filings increased from 32% to 53%.

The level

of investigational new drug applications filled during this period
remained fairly constant.

The time required for research and development and for approval
of a new product has also increased since 1962,

Sarett showed that

the development times for new drugs increased from 2 years in the

1958-1962 period, to 5~ - 8 years in the period from 1968 to 1972.
Development time tripled during the decade from 1962 to 1972.

The

average regulatory approval times in the U.S. and overseas also
increased, as shown:

1962

u.s.

6 mo.

40 mo,

Overseas

6 mo.

9 mo.

2

variable

16 mo.

Clymer, H. A.; The Changing Costs and Risks of Pharmaceutical

Innovation, Economics of Drug Innovation; 1970; J.D. Cooper, ed.;

pp. 109-124.
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Adding approval times to development time, the total time
required to market a new drug product, from innovation to public
availability, is 7.5 to 15 years.

Schwartzman used 10 years for

the estimated Rand D period because he felt that this value
represented an average of Sa.rett I s and Clymer' s estimates.

Sarett showed that the cost of developing a new drug rose from
$1.2 million in 1962 to $11.5 million in 1973.

He attributed a

large portion of this increase to changes in FDA regulations.
Peltzman and Baily estimated that increased regulatory stringency
from the passage of the 1962 drug amendments increased the cost
of R and D for a new chemical entity by 136%.

Schwartzman estimated

the Rand D cost per new chemical entity in 1960 to be $1.02 million.
In 1973 this value increased by 1,015% to $10.35 million.
Mund showed that while total development costs for ethical products
rose from $50 million in 1951 to $472 million in 1968, the number of
new chemical entities produced by the Rand D effort declined from
42 to 1956 to just 11 in 1968 (Table III) (3).
An analysis of the cost data from Table III showed that from
1951 to 1962, costs rose at an annual rate of approximately $17
million while from 1962 to 1968, the annual increase was $33 million.
This indicates that after 1962, when the FDA amendments were passed,
the annual Rand D expenditure rate increased at a faster rate.
A major criterion for evaluating the effect of public policy,
3

Mund, V. A~; The Return on Investment in the Innovative
Pharmaceutical Firm· Economi·cs of Drug Innovati·on· 1970· JD

'

Cooper, ed.; pp. 125-138.

'

'

..
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TABLE III
Industry New Product Performance.
Company Financed Rand D Expenditures
and New Chemical Entities (NCE)
1951-1968
Midpoint Year
in 10 Year Cycle
R & D Exp. (mill 2.

Yr
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
Source:

$

50
63
67
78
91
105
127
170
197
206
227
238
267
278
329
374
412
472

Yr

New NCE's

1956
1957
1958
1959
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

42
51
44
63
63
45
39
27
16
17
23
12
25
11

Mund, V.A., Econ. of Drug Innovation, 1970, p. 129.

such as government regulation, on investment decisions, including

Rand D, has been the impact of policy on the expected rate of
return (4).

If a proposed policy reduced the expected rate of

return on investment in Rand D below the level available from
alternative investments, then the amount of investment in Rand D

would be reduced.

Both Mund and Schwartzman calculated rates of

return on Rand D investment.

They used capital budgeting

4
Schwartzman, D.; Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry;

1976; The Johns Hopkins Press; Baltimore and London.
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techniques which took into account the time value of money.

Mund estimated the time periods for the complete cycle of
drug development, from basic research through introduction of the
product to the recovery period for the investment (Fig. 1).
He stated that profitability analysis in the pharmaceutical
industry could be misleading, since it was usually based on the
analysis of financial statements and generally accepted/accounting

principles.

Under the matching system for balancing costs against

revenues to determine profit, expenditures must either be expensed
in the current year or carried forward as assets to be written off
against revenue in future years.

Unless it can be readily seen how

certain expenditures will benefit future sales, these expenditures
must be written off as current expenses.

In the pharmaceutical

industry it is difficult to estimate future sales, since there is a

high degree of uncertainty associated with undeveloped, unproven and
nonapproved drugs.

As a result of this difficulty, it is necessary

to use an analytical technique considering the time value of money.
Mund estimated $15 million to be a realistic average of the
development cost of a typical new drug product.

R and D costs were

deductible, so at a 50% tax rate, this amount would actually cost
the company only $7.5 million.
after-tax cash outlay.

This value was used as a net

A 10 year development period was assumed,

as was a 15 year sales period (see Fig. 1).
He used a value of 13% as the average after-tax return, since
it was the average earned by all industry.
discount rate used in the calculations.

This value was the

He found the $7 .5 million

Fig. 1
FLOW CHART SHOWING TIME PERIODS FROM
SPECIFIC RESEARCH TO MARKETING

A NEW PRODUCT

PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE ( 15yr)

RS.D

INTRODUCTION
( 2 yr)

( IO yr)

2·

·4

MIDPOINT
( INVESTMENT
OCCURS)

6

i

8

10

•

12

RECOVERY PERIOD
( 13 yr)

.·14. .·1s·. .·1s

i
i
SALES PROFITABLE
BEGIN

I

I

I

20

I

I

22

I

24

SALES BEGIN

I-'

w
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principal invested in year one increased to $17.65 million in year
8 at 13%.

As annual cash inflow of $2.9 million started a year 8

and continued for 13 years to recover the investment principal.
The necessary annual sales to generate an after-tax profit of
$2~9 million (the amount necessary to recover the investment, was

as follows:
Annual Sales
Required (Millions)

After-tax operating margin (%)
15

19.2

20

14.4

25

11.5

It could be seen that annual sales of $19.2 million were
requiI'ed to recover this investment within its 20 year life at an

after-tax operating margin of 15%.

In 1967 only 34 products of the

hundreds on the market achieved an annual sales level of $10
million and only 12 achieved a $20 million level.

Therefore, few

drug products would yield the 13% rate of return.

This would be a

concern to management in the decision making process considering

investment in Rand D.

Schwartzman calculated the expected rate of return on Rand D
projects currently (1973) and for 1960.

(1

+ i)

+

Cz
(1 + i)2

+ ••• +

y

+ ••• +
(1 + i)n+Z

He used the formula:

(1

+ i)n

n+m
0

+

15

where c = annual cost of research, Y
discount rate, and n,m

=

annual net income, i

number of years.

=

This equation represents

a stream of discounted expenditures subtrac.ted from a stream of
discounted income earned from the expenditures.

The equation

determined the rate of return from the projected streams of
expenditures and income.

The estimated cost of R and D for a new

drug was $24.4 million, or $12.2 million after taxes.

The annual

rate, over a 10 year development time was 12.2/10 = $1.22.
Income was estimated by adding profits and Rand D expenditures and
subtracting the cost of financing working capital and fixed assets,
with adjustments for taxes.
Schwartzman used 8% as the interest rate for financing.

The

formula for finding y was:
y

.5 {(Profits before taxes+ Rand D +

.08 debt
debt+ equity

(Working Capital + Net Plant) - .08 (Working Capital + Net Plant2./
where .5 was the 50% tax rate.
of sales.

Net profit after taxes was 15.4%

To adjust this rate to reflect the cost of financing the

required investment, 2.5% was subtracted to give a profit margin of
12.8% of sales as the return on investment in Rand D.

He used $11

million as the estimated average level of international sales per
drug product.

To find annual net profits per drug, sales were

multipled by the profit margin to give a $1.4 million value.

In the

introductory period and in the declining period of the product life
cycle, the profits were lower to reflect the costs of introduction

16
and the decrease in profits associated with the decline stage.
costs and income were shown in Table IV.

The product life cycle was

TABLE· IV
Stream of R & D Costs and
Net Income for an Average
New Chemical Entity (Millions)
R & D

YE:_~:::

CosL.(.£2_

_,
0

Li.

5
6

7
8

9

10

.47
.94
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
.94
.47

11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Source:

Net InC:ome (Y)

-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22
-1.22

1
2

Schwartzman, D., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical

Industry, 1976, p. 143.
estimated to be 15 years.
when it was 5 years.

The

This life cycle increased since 1960,

This increase was thought to be due to a

decrease in the number of new drugs introduced each year.

The

dee li.ne was ascribed to increased difficulty in obtaining FDA

17
approval and in discovering and developing new drugs.
The expected rate of return was found by solving Schwartzman's
equation for i.

The value obtained was 3 .3% when a 15 .4% gross

margin figure and a 15 year commercial life were used (Table V).
TABLE V

Expected Rates of Return on R & D
Investments in 1973 and 1960
Gross Margins (%)
Commerical Life

Yr.

15.4

17.5

20.0

15

3.3

4.6

6.0

20

5.1

6.3

7.5

5

11.4

14.9

18.4

(Yr)
1973

1960
Source:

Schwartzman, D., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry,

1976, p. 144 & 151.
The gross margin figure was based on the reported figures from six
large pharmaceutical companies.

The expected rate of return in 1973, which was used as a current
estimate, was compared with the value for 1960.

The large investments

in.Rand Din the late SO's and early 60's were made because the
rate of return was higher.

In 1960, the cost of developing a new

product was $650,000, after-taxes, spread over a development period
of only 5 years.

Some estimates of the R and D period during this

time were even shorter.

The same equation was used to calculate the

present value of the stream of costs and income.

The c values were

the cost, $650,000 divided by 5 to yield $130,000 per year.

The y

value for a three year plateau within the 5 year product life cycle

18
was estimated at $280,000 per year per product.
costs and income was then:

The stream of

(millions)

Year

~

-.13
-.13
-.13
-.13
-.13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.14
.28
.28
.28
.14

9

10

Solving this equation for i gave a value of 11.4% for the
expected rate of return, based on a 15.4% gross margin (see Table V).
Schwartzman noted that the decrease in the rate of return
occurred sharply, immediately after the passage of the 1962 drug
amendments, rather than gradually and informly over the thirteen
year period.

The evidence suggested a correlation between the

declining expected rate of return and more stringent FDA regulation
requirements since the early 1960's.
The Health Research Group of the FDA is currently considering
proposals which, if accepted, would require an additional toxicity
testing and would consequently delay further the development and
marketing of new drug products.

These proposals would also

increase the costs of Rand D dramatically.

The restrictiveness

of FDA regulations has resulted in a downward trend in the average

effective patent life of new drug products.

The Best Judgment

Estimates of the average effective patent life of drugs approved in

19
1966-1969 compared with those approved in 1970-1973 dropped from
13.9 years to 12.4 years.

Since this average covered all classes

of drug products, the decline suggested that greater FDA
restrictiveness was responsible, rather than a depletion of

research opportunities.

A depletion of research opportunities

would be expected to affect only a few therapeutic classes of drugs.
Also, the average regulatory period for drugs marketed in 1970-1973
was 5.6 years, which was 1.6 years longer than the 4.0 years in the

1966-1969 period.

The new HRG proposals would increase the- research

period by an estimated twelve to eighteen months.

In addition, the

regulatory period would be lengthened so that the total Rand D
period would be extended by up to 2-2.5 years.

This increased Rand D

time would likely be at the expense of the marketable life of the
product.

The rate of return would also expected to be reduced even

further under these proposals.

Results

Problem Statement
The main problem addressed in this study was whether or not
increased regulatory restrictions imposed by the government have
led to a decrease in the number of new products introduced by the
drug companies within the industry.

The FDA has been tightening

its restrictions in both the safety testing and marketing areas
since the passage of the 1962 amendments.

This increased

regulation has affected the development times and costs and the
profitability of Rand D projects to such an extent that managers
in firms in the industry must be more critical of projects which
are being considered for investment.
Since few products survive the stringent approval process,

each project must be analyzed thoroughly for potential profitability.
Each must meet the required rate of return set down by management
and the acceptance criteria used for determining satisfactory
investments.

Capital budgeting methods, which consider the time value of
money, are one way of determining the acceptability of investments.

These methods have been used in one form or another by various authors
in the field of economics to determine expected rates of return,

over time, of Rand D investments and the level of sales required to
return certain rates of return on investment by the pharmac·eutical

20

21

industry.

These authors have not directly addressed the question of

whether or not the investments have

1,2t

traditional acceptance

criteria for decision making by mana;j-;ment ..

Therefore, to determine if the R and D projects alluded to by
these authors would be acceptable to management, the analysis
presented in this study addressed the acceptability question directly.
Using the capital budgeting techniques which were detailed in the
methodology section, the acceptability of the R and D projects
presented by Mund and Schwartzman was evaluated,
Methodology
Capital budgeting (capital-expc·diture planning) is the
allocation of capital among al ternati.ve investment opportunities (1).
It is regarded as one of the most important functions of management

in the firm.

It takes into account the time value of money.

According to Weston, the objective is to develop an optimum capital
budget, i.e., the level of investment that maximizes the present
value of the firm (2).

This budget :!.:: simultaneously determined by

the interaction of supply and demand forces under conditions of
uncertainty,

Supply forces refer to the firm's cost of capital.

Demand is related to the investment opportunities open to the firm
or the stream of revenues resulting from an investment decision.

Uncertainty must be a part of the decision since it is impossible.

1
Haynes, N, W., and Henry, W. R.; Managerial Economics: Analysis
and Cases; 3rd ed.; 1974; Business Publications, Inc,; Dallas,
2
Weston, J, F. and Brigham, E, F.; Managerial Finance, 5th ed.;
1975; Dryden Press; Hinsdale, Illinois,
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to know exactly what the project will cost or what revenues will
be gained.

The external forces and influences affecting the firm,

including government regulations and restrictions, must be
considered as part of the uncertainty surrounding any investment

decision.

Van Horne stated that an investment proposal should be

judged in relation to whether it could provide a return equal to
or greater than that required by potential investors (3).
This required rate of return relates the affect of the
investment decision to the share price and is thus an important
consideration in maintaining the attractive investment image of the

firm.

A project which would not meet this level of return would

not be acceptable for the investment of large amounts of funds.
For large firms investing large sums of money in research and

development projects with a high degree of uncertainty, both
internal and external, sophisticated techniques must be used to

determine the best possible allocation of these funds.

Some of the

techniques commonly employed by these firms in their capital
budgeting decision-making processes include net present value

analysis, the internal rate of return method and the profitability
index.

Certain firms have used variations of each method which have

resulted in highly complex, specifically tailored techniques to
reflect individual acceptance criteria.

A simplified explanation

of each technique was presented in this section.
3

Van Horne, J. C.; Financial Management and Policy; 2nd ed.;
1971; Prentice Hall; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
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I.

Net Present Value Method

This method is one of the most widely used discounted cash
flow techniques.

The present value of the expected net cash flows,

usually discounted at the cost of capital, is found and the initial
cash outlay is subtracted to yield the net present value.

If the

net present value is positive the project is acceptable while if
it is negative the project is not acceptable.

For two mutually

exclusive projects, the one with the higher net present value
should be chosen.

The formula for the Net Present Value is:
N

NPV

~

Rt

~

- C

(1 + k)t

t=l

In this formula, R represents the net cash flows, such as
those realized from the investment, k is the cost of capital,
C is the initial cash outlay and N is the number of periods, or
the time, over which cash inflows will be received.

The marginal

cost of capital, k could also be defined as the required rate of
return since the firm must at least recover its invested funds at

a rate equal to or greater than that which it must pay for those
funds.
II.

Internal Rate of Return Method

This method defines an interest rate that equates the present
value of the expected future cash flows with the initial cash outlay.
The fonnula is:
N

~

t = 1

- C

0
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where the discount rate, r, is defined as the internal rate of
return.

Its value is usually found by trial and error.

The

normal acceptance criterion used with the Internal Rate of Return.
method is the comparison of the internal rate of return with the
required, or hurdle, rate of return.

If the internal rate of

return exceeds the required rate, the investment is acceptance,

if not, it normally should be rejected.
Commenting on which method is the most appropriate one to use,
Weston stated that if management was trying to maximize the value

of the firm, it should chose the project with the highest net
present value.

Therefore, he concluded that firms should, in

gener~l, use the net present value method for evaluating investment

proposals.
III.

Profitability Index Method

The profitability index, on benefit-cost ratio, was defined by
Van Horne as the present value of future net cash flows over the
initial cash outlay.

It is expressed as:

N

PI

t{

Rt
1

(1 + k)t
Ro

where Rt is the cash flow, N is the number of periods, k is the
required rate of return and R0 is the initial cost.

The index

shows the relative profitability, or present value of benefits,
per dollar of cost.

A ratio of LO or greater indicates that the
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is profitable and acceptable.

The profitability index

net present value always give the same accept-reject

but these methods can give different project rankings,
depending on whether the projects being considered are mutually

exclusive.
In applying capital budgeting methods to the evaluation of
research projects in the pharmaceutical industry, several influences
on the net present value of such projects were determined.

The

number of periods (years, quarters, etc.) in which cash flow were
expected, the required -rate Of return and the initial research and

administrative costs were estimated.

The patent life of a drug

product was used as an estimate of the number of periods in which
an inflow of revenues could be expected since the products highest
sales could be expected under patent protection.

If, however,

government restrictions on the marketing of the product were to

occur, the level of revenues during the pre-marketing period would
be lower than under general marketing.

These uneven cash inflows

in the first few periods would affect the overall net present value
of the investment and result in the entire project being less
profitable than it would be without marketing restrictions.
Influences on the required rate of return could arise from the
uncertainty involving the final approval of new products for general
marketing after both safety and effectiveness testing and premarketing has taken place.

With the possibility of fewer Rand D

projects surviving the increased scutiny; the firm's required rate

of return on the surviving projects would be higher than before.
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Therefore, proposed investments would be required to generate a
higher rate of return than under less stringent government

requirements for testing.

Whether such products could do this

successfully could not be assured.

Higher initial costs incurred

in starting research programs. leading to a new pro duet would be.

due to more elaborate animal and volunteer testing to ensure both

safety and effectiveness with a minimum of side effects.

More

highly trained personnel and larger facilities in which to perform
testing and analysis could also add to labor and overhead cosi:s
and to investment in fixed assets by the company.
Analysis
The calculations of 1'1und and Schwartzman were used as a basis

for calculating the net present value of the investment in Rand D
which management would have to consider in making decisions on whether

or not to proceed with projects.

Since the sums of money would be

quite large, this analysis and the results obtained would have
considerable impact on the firm's future level of innovative activity.
To find the net present value of Mund' s example, the annual cash
inflows of $2. 9 million would were multipled by their present value
coefficients from years 8-20 to find the annual present values.
The total present value obtained was then subtracted from $7.5
million to obtain the net present value of the investment.

The net

present value thus obtained was $7,468,788 - $7,500,000 = $31,212.
The profitability index was

7 468 788
$ •
•
$7,500,000

= .9958.

rate of return was slightly over 13% (Table VI).

The internal
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TABLE VI
Applications of Capital Budgeting
Methods to Rand D Investment
PV

Yr.

$1,084,093
959,360
849,008
751,337
664,906
558,389
520,719
460,227
407,803
360,884
319,354
282,608
250 099
$7,468,783

8
9
10
11

12
13

TOTAL

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
PV
NPV

=

PI
IRR
~

$7,468,783
7 468 783
7,500,000

7,500,000

-$31,212

.9958

13%

previously established acceptance criteria, this investment

1ot acceptable since NPV was negative and PI was less than one.

Led with the doubtful level of sales ($19.2 million) required

rn 13%, this investment appeared to be highly risky unless there
non-monetary factors or benefits which would make it more

3.ctive.

To calculate the net present value and profitability index

chwartzman's example, a discount rate of 10% was arbitrarily

en, since this rate was close to the overall rate of return

ired by industry in general (4).
4

At 10%, the calculations

Schwartzman, D.; Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry;

; The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press; Baltimore and London.
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:he net present value was negative and the profitability
as than • 5 (Tab le VII).
TABLE VII
NPV and PI of Average NCE
(Millions)
Annual Present Value
-1,109,090
-1,008,245
916,599
833,272
757,522
688,653
626,055
569,142
517,402
470 359
164,730
299,512
405,524
368,662
335,146
304,682
276,976
251,804
228,914
208,096
189,182
171,990
156,352
95,438
43,381
NET PRESENT VALUE:

PROFITABILITY INDEX

Total Present Value

-7,496,339

3 500 389
- 3,995,950
.4669
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Discussion and Conclusions

drug industry relies so heavily on Rand D innovatio~
of products which in turn provide it with its income,

:e with or restrictions on this R and D process would

;t the income producing ability of the industry.

If

:urn on R and D investment ·was not comparable to that
and was not adequate to sustain an Rand D program,

1

would eventually decline.

Investors in the

:hese companies would not be encouraged to continue
~

companies which were in such a

11

no-win 11 situation.

:aught in this dilemma would be encouraged to shift

~fforts to a less restrictive regulatory climate,

•resently found overseas.

As a result, the U.S.

receive less advanced medical health care products

1st than even before, since the products that were

, U.S. would be at a greater cost per product and would
make a high rate of return.

Management in the

be under greater pressure to make investment
the heightened degree of uncertainty regarding the
products and would be more cautious to commit
and D projects with uncertain outcomes.

Capital

.iques would have to be highly sophisticated to
fW P.!JJUSVililHJ1'
-

--

tential costs and the effects of possible time delays

. . ·:·.
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,arch or regulatory periods.

:ments once thought attractive would have to be re-

,nd possibly discontinued because of regulatory

18 •

capital budgeting methods, such as those used by
to evaluate investment decisions were applied to the

,sented by Mund, the acceptance criteria indicated that

, investment in R and D was not acceptable on a purely

,sis.

The Schwartzman calculations indicated that the

~urn on Rand D investment declined almost three-fold over

ecade.

The sharpest drop was seen immediately fol lowing

, of the 1962 Kefauver amendments to the Food, Drug and

\ct.

The average ten year development period could be

and the patent life shortened as much as two years under

coposed additional testing restrictions.

The 3.3%

,te of return on Rand D investment which was found by

1

was less than the rate used by other industries as a

riterion, which has been approximately 10% after taxes.

, pharmaceutical industry was discouraged completely

3ipating in innovative research programs to develop new

only remaining source of these programs would be non-profit
or academic facilities.

Since it was pointed out that

resently accounts for approximately 90% of all new drug

search, the void to be filled by government would be

le.

Since the source of operating funds for government

_wm1v.11-r;';&

,_

is tax revenue, it is conceivable that any sizeable

'

D program would require a large tax-financed budget.

'

=
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ouragement by Rand Din private industry would
overnment participation and control of health care

. s.
capital budgeting techniques and acceptance

sed as the sole basis for evaluating Rand D
::; was also uncertain ..

Perhaps, if a company was

relation to other firms within the same industry,

E return on investment would not be as important

, to other Rand D investment proposals.

For

could continue in the research venture as long

\ its marginal costs and fully utilizing its
1ary pressures, which have increased the

' a single drug product by 50% over the last
:t the industry and have made cost figures appear
:luence has affected every sector of business,

', however, and for the purposes of this discussion
: a constant.

cld be argued successfully that increased regulatory

I

·.nefited the public through safer and more
consensus of most authors in the field of
e FDA, by concentratiug solely ou safety and
nd ignoring the economic impacts of regulation,

eutical industry.

Unless the industry is allowed

onable profit with a rate of return on Rand D
sufficient to recover its costs, innovative

fCO AWl!SU1El~i

·-=,_

anies will decline.

If this happens the U.S.

..

~
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cce ever-increasing health care costs in the form

LXation and control of another major aspect of

--
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